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25 MAY 1962

The Honorable,  
The Secretary of State  
Washington 25, D. C.

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Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have looked over the 7 May draft of "Basic National Security Policy" (Parts I and II) with a great deal of interest and would like to offer a few observations on it. From the intelligence point of view, generally speaking, we agree with the basic assessments in the paper and find nothing directly and specifically inconsistent with current National Intelligence Estimates. The comments that follow, therefore, are pointed at possible omissions or differences of emphasis.

First, I would like to call to your attention a recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 11-9-62, "Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy," dated 2 May 1962) which discussed three factors that might over the long run moderate Soviet behavior and soften its outlook on international politics. These factors are the influence of popular aspirations, the growth of divisions in the international Communist movement, and the success or failure of Soviet foreign policy in the years to come. The estimate concluded that the third of these was the most important. I feel that the policy paper, by contrast, places the greatest emphasis on the first, making it almost a matter of certainty, and except for a reference on page 29, tends to ignore the third. Paragraph a. on page 27 might, therefore, be expanded to point out that defense of the free community is a way of inducing changes in Soviet society, perhaps the only important way.

A second point that occurs to me is that this paper calls for the organization of a "hard core" of developed nations, based, ultimately, on mutual common interests both with respect to one another and to the other free nations. The paper recognizes that the evolutionary process of organization will meet with resistance (page 86), but nonetheless seems to me to minimize the difficulties involved. For example, a statement on page 49 says: "The danger that a united

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Europe linked to the Atlantic Community will emerge as a third force deliberately prepared, for example, to play the United States and the USSR off against each other is relatively slight, so long as essential European interests are protected within the Atlantic Partnership." This statement tends to beg the real question, which is precisely whether the European countries (especially France) believe their essential interests are so protected. In the same vein, the material on page 101 suggests that consultation by itself will cause the emergence of a broad common policy and that the problem is one of creating a mechanism for "expressing" the common interests of the Atlantic Alliance. No doubt such interests exist, but the paper should discuss in greater detail the difficulties of identifying and agreeing upon them. As it stands it seems to me to reflect an unrealistic degree of optimism about the community of interests among the "hard core" nations.

This leads me to my final point. The special problems of the Far East do not seem in this paper to get the special attention which they deserve. Thus a general objective of [redacted]

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[redacted] despite the obvious difficulties this involves, is almost the only positive strategic line of action recommended for the Far East. As far as Communist China is concerned, the paper seems to say that we apply the same watchful waiting "containment" policy to the Peiping regime that we have adopted for the Soviet Union. The treatment of the special cases and special pressures of Communism in Asia, particularly in China, get rather superficial attention. The paper notes (pp. 142-148) that the Chinese Communists are feeling the effects of a major crisis in their efforts to reach great power status and yet remain utterly hostile and intransigent toward both Moscow and Washington. It seems a little bland, then, to recommend only the very long term policy of avoiding provocation and hoping things will be better after Mao and his colleagues will die and a "basic reorientation in Chinese political and international life" will ensue. This strikes me as simply adopting an attitude of hopefulness rather than facing up to what may be much more pressing short term strategic convulsions in Asia thrust on us by the Chinese Communists.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) JOHN A. McCONE

CONCUR:

John A. McCone  
Director

DEPUTY DIRECTOR INTELLIGENCE

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